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CAMP IN JORDAN
2
3
4
Abstract5
This article explores the complex interplay between masculinity and nationalism amongst Pales-
tinians living in a refugee camp in Jordan. As the expression of either immoral behaviour or
unthinking radicalism, youth masculinity in the camp is widely perceived in Jordan as a symbol
of cultural and political difference and the failure of camp dwellers to embrace assimilation.
However, camp dwellers’ masculinities are not uniform. I argue that young men’s ability to
navigate and master diverse and sometimes contrasting registers of manhood enables them to
reproduce a Palestinian national identity in exile while achieving socioeconomic integration in
Jordan. In pursuing this argument, the article has two goals: to challenge popular stereotypes
about Palestinian refugees in Jordan today; and, on a broader level, to problematize the discursive
mutual dependency between nationalism and hegemonic masculinity in the study of Palestinian
masculinity.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Originally set up in 1955 to host Palestinians who had fled Palestine following the17
establishment of the State of Israel, the refugee camp al-Wihdat is today part of Amman,18
the capital of Jordan.1 Al-Wihdat’s inhabitants, like many other Palestinian refugees19
in Jordan, enjoy full citizenship rights through an amendment to the Passport Act of20
1949. Nevertheless, many people in Jordan suspect that al-Wihdat (and Palestinian21
refugee camps in general) is inhabited by unruly individuals incapable of integrating22
into Jordanian society. Local authorities, for example, describe its inhabitants—male23
adolescents and young men especially—as threatening and hostile “others,”2 a depiction24
that feeds into pejorative popular views of the camp dwellers.25
I encountered such a pejorative view in my conversation with the head of al-Wihdat’s26
police station, from whom I was seeking approval to conduct research in the camp. As27
he sat in his armchair watching a popular Lebanese soap opera on a large plasma TV, he28
complained to me about his troubles at work:29
My job is very difficult. Here there are many sorts of crimes! . . . Everything! Drugs, stabbings,30
homicides, fights . . . Everything! [We have problems] in the summer especially, when young31
men get out of their houses and vent their frustrations . . . Unemployment and the poor conditions32
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of infrastructure aggravate the situation . . . Yes, you can say it, the camp is much worse than the33
surrounding areas. It is a dangerous place!34
This kind of representation is echoed by the Jordanian upper class in well-off neigh-35
borhoods of West Amman, and even in poor areas of the city. “Be careful in al-Wihdat;36
it’s a dangerous place,” I was continuously reminded by people genuinely concerned37
for my safety after hearing the subject of my research.3 “Folks from outside” (na¯s min38
barra), as camp dwellers call them, think of al-Wihdat and other camps in contradictory39
terms as places of immoral sinners and religious fanatics, as hubs for troublemakers40
(mashkaljiyye) in general.41
People from the outside see youth as most dramatically exhibiting deviant behavior.42
A constant source of social anxiety, camp youth are seen as idlers and loafers (dawa¯wı¯n)43
who are responsible for a large share of the problems that afflict the camp—from petty44
crimes, such as fighting, theft, and drug dealing, to family feuds to political radical-45
ization and Islamic fundamentalism. The alleged social marginalization and political46
estrangement of refugees has led some authors to question the very idea that camp47
dwellers—young men (shaba¯b) especially—nurture any genuine feeling of identifica-48
tion with the Jordanian state.449
These enduring stereotypes about camp dwellers are involuntarily reinforced by a50
specific understanding of masculinity in the scholarly literature. An established body51
of scholarship exists on the discursive construction of masculinity. Highlighting the52
fictitious character of masculinity, this scholarship has explored gender’s role in the53
imaginative and material production of the nation.5 A portion of this literature deals54
with the relationship between gender norms and Palestinian nationalism. Drawing on55
the notion of “hegemonic masculinity,”6 it has explored the performance of a style of56
manhood that celebrates militaristic notions of irreducible resistance and independence,757
the anxieties emanating from the incapacity to embody this ideal of masculinity,8 the58
shunning of the “feminine” within official Palestinian national discourse,9 and the co-59
existence of different scripts of masculinities.10 In a recent article on the construction of60
masculinity in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan, for example, Jason Hart has shown61
how camp dwellers “reproduce the camp as an authentic location of an exilic national62
community” through the instantiation of a hegemonic masculinity.11 This ideal form of63
masculinity takes shape around heroic expressions of independence, bravery, and male64
assertiveness; it is defined in opposition to supposedly feminine characteristics, such as65
submissiveness and passivity.66
In this article, I explore the complex interplay between masculinity and nationalism67
amongst Palestinian refugees living in al-Wihdat. In so doing, I challenge not only68
popular stereotypes about Palestinian refugees in Jordan today, but also the discursive69
mutual dependence between nationalism and hegemonic masculinity in the literature.70
The display of manly values is doubtless central to the way young men in the camp71
express Palestinian nationalism whilst in exile.12 Yet I argue that, more than the per-72
formance of a hegemonic masculinity, it is the ability to downplay overt expressions73
of these values and to move between diverse and contrasting styles of manhood that74
enables the reproduction of Palestinian nationalism in exile.75
When used to assess the imbrication of gender and Palestinian nationalism, the con-76
cept of hegemonic masculinity has a number of interrelated problems. First, it sets a77
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standard of masculinity against which all other masculinities are measured, leading to78
a poor understanding of the complexities of being a Palestinian man in the camps. Ac-79
cording to the logic of hegemonic masculinity, Palestinian men in al-Wihdat can only80
be interpreted as frustrated individuals, whether due to ostracism in their communities81
for not upholding the qualities of hegemonic masculinity or due to marginalization82
within broader Jordanian society, where their display of those same qualities are seen as83
evidence of unruliness and unwillingness to integrate.1384
Second, the notion of hegemonic masculinity seems to imply a binary understand-85
ing of refugees’ agency: while certain “hegemonic” virtues such as assertiveness and86
independence are associated with Palestinian nationalism and resistance to integration,87
“subordinate” male traits such as passivity and compliance are association with assimi-88
lation and normalization in the host country.14 Accordingly, refugees can either assert a89
virulent and liminal national identity by performing a hegemonic masculinity, or pursue90
integration in Jordan through a subordinate masculinity.91
However, living in exile in al-Wihdat, refugees continuously reproduce their allegiance92
to Palestinian nationalism despite performing attributes traditionally associated with a93
subordinate masculinity. As Marcia Inhorn states, the notion of hegemonic masculinity94
“obscures the lived reality of different forms of masculinity as ever-changing social95
strategies enacted through practice. Actual men’s performances of gender are constantly96
in flux and may change radically as their social-physical circumstances change.”15 In97
the camps, young men certainly aspire to act out a hegemonic masculinity, but they are98
critical of those who yearn to embody such ideals exclusively, accusing them of being99
unable to adapt to changing circumstances in Jordan.16 I show here that the very people100
who, to use Robert W. Connell’s phrasing, are “complicit” in reproducing hegemonic101
masculinity sometimes appreciate and even seek to embody attributes that are antithetical102
to it.17103
H E G E M O N I C I D E A L S O F M A S C U L I N I T Y I N T H E C A M P : F RO M104
DAW ¯AW ¯IN T O SHUY ¯UKH105
At first glance, paradigmatic styles of manhood in al-Wihdat parallel a local cliche´ that106
camp dwellers are inherently unruly.18 These styles are best embodied by the figure of107
the dawa¯njı¯ (pl. dawa¯wı¯n).19 The word dawa¯njı¯ shares the same root as dı¯wa¯n, and the108
plural form of dawa¯njı¯, dawa¯wı¯n, is also the plural form of dı¯wa¯n, the latter of which109
means the collected poetic works of an individual or a tribe. In daily speech the term110
dawa¯njı¯ has come to indicate someone who boasts and brags, and who passes time telling111
stories and idling in the company of friends rather than working.Dawa¯wı¯n organize their112
time around forms of sociability that, according to “mainstream” attitudes in the camp,113
are immoral, such as consuming alcohol and drugs. They are also said to exhibit a strong114
appetite for women, independence, male assertiveness, and transgressive behavior. In115
Jordanian dialect, the word dawa¯njı¯ is generally used to denote any kind of thug or116
troublemaker, regardless of origin or place of residence. However, the word also evokes117
a hostile attitude toward the authorities that is widely associated with “camp refugees”118
(awla¯d al-mukhayyam, or mukhayyamjiyye).119
Violence is frequently said to be a distinguishing feature of masculinity in the camp.120
In fact, violence is etched onto the faces of dawa¯wı¯n in the scars stretching diagonally121
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across their checks, which are the result of cuts they inflict upon each other as reminders122
of some past event. The association between dawa¯wı¯n and violence is further reinforced123
by sensational nicknames.20 For their unpredictable and explosive behavior, dawa¯wı¯n124
earn sobriquets such as khart
.
u¯sh (from khart
.
u¯sha, meaning “cartridge”) or bunduqiyye125
(rifle).126
Dawa¯wı¯n often display other distinctive features as well. These include long hair, a127
purposefully long fingernail (on the little finger) in which they take pride, and shabby128
dress. A dawa¯wı¯n can typically be seen in jeans, dirty t-shirts, and tattered tracksuits129
that are occasionally combined with garish garments such as studded shoes or belts130
with brash metal buckles. Tattoos are also common among the dawa¯wı¯n: many in the131
camp have three points tattooed on the back of their hands between the thumb and the132
forefinger, which supposedly symbolize the three-word sentence kuss ukht al-h
.
uku¯ma133
(translated loosely as “fuck the government”). At the time of my fieldwork, being a134
dawa¯njı¯ was for some a source of pride. People who self-identified with the category135
proudly displayed its associated features.21 Still, the term dawa¯wı¯n carried clear negative136
connotations, and those who complied with this ideal type enjoyed little support in or137
outside the camp.138
Things were different in the past. “There was a time when the dawa¯wı¯n were139
muh
.
taramı¯n [respectable]!” people often told me. Many of my friends in the camp140
saw the traits associated with the dawa¯njı¯ as the most tangible consequence of the141
existential emptiness and socioeconomic marginalization experienced there, especially142
among young men.22 There was a time when Jihad—who in the 1960s spent time in an143
Israeli prison— proudly displayed a large tattoo depicting Palestine on his right forearm.144
By the time of my fieldwork, however, the situation had changed drastically. Jihad now145
felt awkward about the allegiance engraved on his body: “I am not young anymore and146
al-Wihdat is different now . . . before there were a lot of dawa¯wı¯n in al-Wihdat, and I147
was one of them . . . But now I do not want people to think that I am a dawa¯njı¯.”148
In the years immediately before and after the showdown in 1970 between the Jor-149
danian army and the PLO militias (i.e., the civil war, or Black September), dawa¯wı¯n150
fitted the ideal of active resistance. Even today, in the narratives of refugees, the terms151
fida¯©iyı¯n (guerrilla fighters) and dawa¯wı¯n often intersect. As long as the figure of the152
armed fighter embodied the ideal of resistance, the dawa¯wı¯n’s quarrelsome spirit could153
be admired and respected. However, Black September precipitated a dramatic change154
of status for the fida¯©ı¯yı¯n in Jordan, leading to their expulsion from the kingdom. The155
center of Palestinian resistance shifted first to Lebanon, and then to the occupied ter-156
ritories. With the Jordanian state’s decimation of the fida¯©ı¯yı¯n, on both the political157
and military levels, the myths encircling them began to fade.23 This—along with the158
significant growth of so-called “revivalist” religious discourses in Jordan24—led to the159
rearticulation of camp ideals of masculinity in terms of a different set of values. De-160
void of political significance, dawa¯njı¯ masculinity became de facto marginal, immoral,161
even dangerous; shaykh masculinity, by contrast, became increasingly prominent and162
accepted.163
The Arabic word shaykh (pl. shuyu¯kh) has a wide range of meanings, though in the164
camp it primarily refers to piety and Islamic knowledge. The term is applied to those165
adopting a pious lifestyle and with broad knowledge of Islamic doctrine, regardless of166
political affiliation (though at times it may be used to respectfully address an elderly167
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man or a local leader). More pointedly, a shaykh is one who strives to live by the168
Prophet Muhammad’s example. Although displaying a long beard, a modest haircut,169
and a dishda¯sha (an ankle-length, long-sleeved garment, similar to a robe) is often170
sufficient to gain the appellative of shaykh, many feel that these features do not alone171
indicate that one is a “real” shaykh. Being a shaykh is regarded as a genuine, holistic, and172
all-encompassing endeavor that leads the believer to develop and sustain a God-fearing173
personality. In exchange for complete rigor and devotion, the man of piety achieves a174
life devoid of all ambivalences and inconsistencies.175
The way in which religious commitment (iltiza¯m) finds expression in the lives of176
believers varies widely—from the mere fulfillment of major religious duties, such as177
prayer, almsgiving, and fasting, to attempts to realize a morally and spiritually elevated178
self. In principle, a pious Palestinian man in the camps would not only choose the179
mosque over the street; the pious man would also avoid contact with the opposite180
sex, refrain from lying, and abstain from consuming intoxicating substances (alcohol,181
nicotine, hashish, and so on). Moreover, he would participate in social and political182
activities that promote Palestinian resistance, collect zakat (alms-giving) and distribute183
food to the poor, as well as listen to cassette tape sermons of and study the Qur©an. In184
other words, his iltiza¯m would find expression in a spectrum of social, political, and185
embodied practices all centered upon submission to God. These dispositions converge186
in the figure of the shaykh, who according to many of my informants in the camp is the187
perfect exemplar of a human being (insa¯n) and of manliness (ruju¯liyya) in the modern188
world.25189
The emergence of the shaykh model is not unique to al-Wihdat but rather is common190
among Muslims in the region. The widespread fascination with this style of masculinity191
can be explained by the increasing power of Hamas in the Occupied Territories, the192
concomitant loss of PLO influence,26 and the general rise of Islamism in the Middle193
East.27 In Jordan, mounting levels of religiosity are both symptomatic of, and respon-194
sible for, the growing popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that has factored195
significantly in the lives of male adolescents and young men in al-Wihdat. Since 1971196
the Brotherhood and its political arm, the Islamic Action Front, have filled a vacuum in197
the camp left by the diminishing influence of the PLO’s various factions. Advantaged198
by a special relationship with the regime at a time when all other groups and movements199
were repressed, the Brotherhood built an extended network of health and cultural centers,200
charitable societies, and youth clubs both inside and outside al-Wihdat.28 The capillary201
grassroots activism of the Brotherhood—along with its campaigns against corruption202
and normalization with Israel, and for political inclusion and democratization—allowed203
it to disseminate its ideology and develop a following in order to become one of the204
main representative political bodies in the camp. Although it would be misleading to205
explain camp dwellers’ masculinity through their allegiance to a singular group or206
movement, the Brotherhood has undoubtedly driven a growing fascination with ide-207
als of Islamic manhood among refugees.29 This is especially true of the youth, whose208
clubs—once firmly in the hands of PLO factions—have fallen under the influence of the209
Brotherhood.210
The exhibition of transgressive behavior—once idealized as a sign of masculinity211
among dawa¯wı¯n—is no longer met with a sympathetic public among the Muslim Broth-212
ers and those who—like them—generally identify themselves as shuyu¯kh.30213
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P OT E N C Y, M A S C U L I N I T Y, A N D NAT I O NA L I S M214
In a compelling article, Joseph Massad points out that the “national agent” in Palestinian215
nationalistic discourse articulated by the PLO is a young, muscular, and self-assertive216
male.31 The hegemonic position of this kind of masculinity in the reproduction of217
Palestinian national identity is also evident in al-Wihdat. Although not everyone in the218
camp embodies the image of the hard-boiled fighter or the pious man, the youth aspire to219
act out these ideals of manhood. They perceive the Palestinian national predicament as220
being tightly connected to performances of idealized notions of manhood characterized221
by independence, fierceness, and potency. Indeed, it would be a mistake to see the222
two ideals of manhood—the dawa¯njı¯ and the shaykh—as antithetical. Despite obvious223
differences between them, the shaykh has taken over the dawa¯njı¯’s role as a fighter and224
borrowed many of his virile qualities.225
In the camp, the shaykh embodies a style of masculinity that is appreciated not only226
for its pious qualities, such as religious devotion, spirituality, and studiousness, but227
also for its association with male assertiveness, independence, and potency.32 Camp228
dwellers perceive Islam as crucial to re-enacting hegemonic gender norms. A case in229
point relates to polygyny. I heard several times in the camp that there is nothing wrong230
with marrying two or more women so long as the man is capable of treating his wives231
equally. The latter, of course, demands a great deal of sexual potency: the Muslim232
man must be not only hypervirile, but also sexually prolific. As Inhorn points out, “the233
Islamic mandate to reproduce an Islamic ‘multitude’ encourages pronatalism within234
polygynous marriage, with some men producing their own small tribes of children from235
multiple spouses.”33 Interestingly, very few of the men whom I met in the camp are236
polygamous. Whether certain attributes and practices associated with hypervirility are237
simply narrated or actually embodied by people in the camp is irrelevant here. What is238
important is that certain hegemonic attributes invoke considerable fascination amongst239
the youth. The powerful, virile patriarch who can satisfy his wives and has fathered240
many children represents an ideal of physical strength and endurance. While staring241
at a robust, bearded man one day, a friend—whose father was a shaykh—called my242
attention to the man’s imposing figure: “look, Luigi, you see the shaykh over there? You243
see his arms [mimicking the shape of the man’s massive biceps]? Shuyu¯kh are strong,244
even stronger than dawa¯wı¯n.” With a self-satisfied tone he went on to point out how245
physical strength and bravery are as important qualities for these men of faith as their246
pious dispositions.247
To many in the camp, Islam also plays a role in reproducing ideals of militarism and248
heroism. When dawa¯wı¯n lost their appeal amongst the refugee community, the shuyu¯kh249
inherited the militaristic and heroic traits with which dawa¯wı¯n were associated. The250
Muslim man’s duty to defend Islam when it is threatened from inside or outside made251
the shaykh a veritable bastion against imperialism. In al-Wihdat, the cultivation of a pious252
self enables these men to hold on to the ideological imperative of Palestinian nationalism.253
According to my interlocutors in the camp, Islam allows them to pursue meaning in the254
face of the broken promises of secular nationalism; it is also key to overcoming Arab255
national divisiveness by uniting Arab Muslims, eventually leading, it is hoped, to the256
eviction of the evil (shayt
.
a¯nı¯) forces of Zionism and Western imperialism from Palestine.257
When reflecting on the possibility of political change, many camp dwellers invoke the258
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example of Muslim leaders such as Salah al-Din, whose triumphant liberation of the259
Holy Land from the crusaders centuries ago is evidence of the power of his faith (ı¯ma¯n).34260
This Islamic ideal of masculinity still exerts considerable fascination in al-Wihdat.261
Young men recall the time when their fathers fought Israelis in Jordan or in Lebanon;262
they are proud to have a family member who died while pursuing the goal of national263
liberation. One such young man is Abu ¨Umar, whose piety earned him the appellative of264
shaykh. When Abu ¨Umar was three years old, his father became a shahı¯d (martyr) after265
Israeli soldiers killed him in Lebanon. He was buried in a cemetery in Syria, where his266
son periodically visited him. At the time of my fieldwork, Abu ¨Umar was in his early267
thirties, and he was proud of his father for what he saw as his glorious death. On a few268
occasions, he also confessed his wish to fight for Palestine and Islam in the Occupied269
Territories: “I want to go to Palestine to fight. I don’t know when; I only know that I270
will go, [and] not necessarily to kill—I can also help in other ways.”271
Abu ¨Umar’s urge to follow in his father’s footsteps was particularly evident during272
our two-day journey to Aqaba together. On the last leg of the journey, the road ran parallel273
and with great proximity to the Israeli–Jordanian border. My companion glanced with274
feelings of both excitement and sorrow at the nearby city of Eilat in what is today Israel.275
Turning his gaze away from the hills and back to the Jordanian side of the border, Abu276
¨Umar frowned and said: “I can’t see these mountains and do nothing. My father died277
for them, and I don’t do anything.”278
Physical prowess and militarism do not encompass the full extent of shaykh mas-279
culinity. At its core is the capacity to be a virile agent of change. This capacity contrasts280
with a rather passive ideal of femininity according to which women should be merely281
the nurturers and makers of men.35 According to this ideal, women’s national role is to282
comply with an astringent code of modesty that includes, for example, the adoption of283
specific veiling practices and relegation to the familial sphere.36 Palestinian nationalism284
is thus discussed in highly gendered terms. If young men see struggling against the285
Israeli occupiers and colonizers as a highly masculinizing deed, they perceive “resettle-286
ment” (tawt
.
ı¯n) into the host country as a feminizing act because it indicates a passive287
acceptance of their political situation.288
The full extent to which resettlement is considered to be indicative of an inferior289
masculinity was revealed to me in a conversation with Hussein, a young man I came290
to know during my stay in the camp. Hussein was in his early twenties when I first291
met him. He lived with his family in a small house in a low-income area of al-Wihdat.292
At the time, Hussein was studying in the university to become a high-school teacher.293
He was also volunteering at an educational program for orphans held in a camp youth294
center. During one of this program’s sessions I had the chance to hear his opinion on295
the difference between refugees from the camp and refugees living in well-off areas296
of Amman. “They are all fags (mana¯yik) and whores (shara¯mı¯t),” he said, referring to297
the descendants of the so-called “generation of 1948” (jı¯l al-nakba, or jı¯l al-thama¯niya298
wa-arba¨ı¯n).37 When I asked him what he meant by this, Hussein responded that,299
refugees from ‘48 are different; they are all well-off people who live in places like Jabal Amman,300
Shmisani, or Abdun [affluent neighborhoods in West Amman]. They don’t care about Palestine,301
they don’t live in the camps anymore, and they have money. They are like the urduniyyı¯n [Tran-302
sjordanians]; there is not even a difference between them and the yahu¯dı¯ [Jew]! Have you seen303
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how their women go out in Jabal Amman? None of them is veiled! . . . Here in al-Wihdat, most304
of the people are refugees from 1967 [Palestinians who arrived in Jordan after the 1967 war]. We305
are different . . . we are more respectful of Islam and still care about Palestine!306
Several aspects of Hussein’s comments are particularly noteworthy. First, he seems to307
overlook the fact that al-Wihdat camp was actually set up to accommodate refugees308
from the first exodus—the “generation of 1948.” Second, his statement reveals the309
intersection of class and gender in the performance and representation of masculinity.310
Al-Wihdat is located in the heart of the densely populated working-class quarters of East311
Amman. Although socioeconomic and power disparities exist within the camp, a larger312
socioeconomic and power chasm separates camp dwellers from the rich Jordanian–313
Palestinian upper-class living in the wealthy neighborhoods of West Amman. In his314
comment, Hussein links socioeconomic integration, moral disposition, and national315
identity in order to establish a gender difference between the refugees of 1948 and316
those of 1967. The former are more likely to have found a decent job over the course317
of almost four generations in Jordan. For this reason, they moved out of the camps318
and ultimately adopted what he terms an “immoral” lifestyle. In Hussein’s view, the319
comfortable and luxurious lifestyles of these refugees have caused them to forget their320
origins (as
.
l) and political struggles, rendering them unfit to represent the Palestinian321
national cause. Moreover, since national honor is tightly intertwined with gender and322
religion, their sexuality and morality are also deviant.38 To Hussein, refugees outside323
the camps are “fags” and “whores.” It is marginalized and pious males from the camp324
(“the 1967 generation”) rather than rich Palestinians who best embody the Palestinian325
national predicament.326
T H E I M P O RTA N C E O F B E I N G D O C I L E327
The image of the heroic fighter does not fully exhaust the repertoire of actions and328
attributes associated with dominant ideals of masculinity in al-Wihdat. It is accompanied329
by another model predicated upon the capacity to act as a provider and a nurturer. Despite330
camp dwellers’ harsh criticisms of those who have “abandoned” the moral and manly331
space of the camp to live in well-off areas of Amman, virtually all youths hope to make332
enough money to leave al-Wihdat one day. In fact, Hussein—the very person that drew333
such a sharp distinction between camp and noncamp refugees—studied at the university334
and worked hard as a clerk in a chic West Amman hotel in order to put himself in position335
to secure a good position and earn enough money to wed and leave the camp.39 Such an336
aspiration has to be understood as his negotiation between ideological conviction and337
practical needs.338
Young men’s willingness to act as breadwinners is located in a moral code shared339
among Palestinian refugees in which family provider masculinity is a marker of respected340
adult status.40 In the Palestinian case, then, the family-provider model is clearly entan-341
gled with that of the “bourgeois-in-the-making.”41 According to Massad, this “includes342
not only the masculine ability to launch armed struggle, but also to have a bourgeois343
economic status. The appeal is made in the context of the Palestinian diaspora, where344
most of the Palestinian bourgeoisie now lives.”42 The nationalist agent is one who pays345
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for the education of “his” brother and sister, takes care of “his” parents, raises “his”346
children, and dreams in “his” heart of returning to Palestine.43347
For the refugees in al-Wihdat, the rising cost of living has rendered docility and348
compliance the only available paths to full social adulthood. In addition, since Black349
September, the government has discouraged overt expressions of toughness and hostility350
among refugees by implementing a number of measures aimed at tightening its control351
over the camp. In 1986, for example, the Nadi al-Wihdat passed under the control of the352
Ministry of Youth and Sport. Originally set up and supervised by the UNRWA, in the353
1970s the club grew into a major sports club and a place of political activism. A decade354
later, the government widened Sumayya Street, a small alley that crossed the camp from355
northwest to southeast, turning it into a large two-lane road in order to allow tanks to356
enter.44 A few years later, on the occasion of the outbreak of the second intifada, the357
government also visibly enlarged the police station located on the outskirts of the camp.358
Many refugees have felt the need to deemphasize certain characteristics that could be359
perceived as aggressive or independent.360
Nader, the owner of a game room notorious in the camp for attracting dawa¯wı¯n,361
explained to me how the increasing government control is leading to the gradual nor-362
malization of al-Wihdat: “Yes! Before, there was mafia! Here, right here, where we sit,363
there was a man that controlled the whole neighborhood (h
.
a¯ra). I knew at least five364
dawa¯wı¯n that were living here and were hanged by the government. Now, the only mafia365
here is the government.” Nader’s narrative is corroborated by Assaf, a man in his thirties366
who, when I first met him, managed a local NGO in the camp: “Yes, many [dawa¯wı¯n]367
were arrested.” Like him, Assaf sees the normalization of the camp (i.e., its economic,368
political, and social integration into the city of Amman) as the result of the government’s369
exerting control over the territory. Another factor, in his view, has been camp dwellers’370
need to find work in a context marked by ethnic discrimination and fierce competition371
over employment: “Now most of them [the dawa¯wı¯n] work. They don’t have time to372
fight and make problems. If you want to live in Jordan, you need a job. This is not easy373
for anybody. For us [people from the camp] it is even more difficult because there is374
racism in Jordan; nobody will ever employ you if you behave like a dawa¯njı¯.”375
Negative stereotypes about camps and refugees further hinder camp dwellers from376
finding work. Many of my interlocutors admitted to having lied to their potential em-377
ployers about their place of residence, claiming to live in the adjoining neighborhood378
of Ashrafiyya. This discrimination is particularly visible in the public sector, where379
“East Bankers” are usually privileged over “Palestinians.” One friend of mine in his late380
twenties summarizes this situation well:381
After graduating from college, I had to wait four years before finding a teaching position! Do382
you know how long it takes for urduniyyı¯n [Transjordanians]45 to find a place? No time—it’s383
straightforward! For us it is as if there is a wall beyond which you cannot go. For example, if you384
work for the police [shurt
.
a], you can’t have more than three stars [senior commander]. I had to385
wait four years before getting a place as a teacher with a salary barely enough to pay my expenses386
[250 dinars] . . . if we were in Palestine, it would have been different; there we would have had387
land, a good position, work, wa¯st
.
a [relationships of patronage]! If you want to get a job here in388
Jordan, you need to work hard, harder than the urduniyyı¯n.389
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The most viable strategy for gaining employment is to build social connections rooted in390
the camp but extending beyond its borders. Refugees’ economic hardships largely relate391
to wa¯st
.
a, or more precisely, the lack of it. While this term can be translated literally392
as “means” or “intermediary,” here it indicates specifically the family connections and393
relationships of patronage that are central to obtaining a job, credit, favors, and housing394
in Jordan. The term refers to both the process of intermediation and the person who, by395
virtue of his or her connections and reputation, provides services and connectivity.46396
In Jordan, ethnic discrimination leaves Palestinian refugees with very few opportuni-397
ties to set up the right connections. And yet building networks is extremely important.398
For young male students enrolled in the university, for example, it can make all the399
difference in determining whether they land a job in the future. My interlocutors saw400
their Transjordanian peers in the university not as inimical others but as friends and401
companions with whom they could have fun, work together, and share other aspects of402
life. In the context of the university, shaba¯b from the camp deploy traits of masculinity403
such as studiousness, docility, and diligence rather than hostility, aggressiveness, and404
independence, to succeed.47405
Camp dwellers not only accept aspirations and behaviors that diverge and at times even406
contradict normative ideals of masculinity in the camp, they also embrace them. Yet these407
different codes of masculinity do not stand in opposition to each other; they are all part of408
how refugees manage their national predicament in the context of exile in Jordan.48 Camp409
dwellers see docility and compliance as essential to maintaining Palestinian nationalism410
as a viable project. Overt displays of independence and aggressiveness devoid of rational411
reflection can exacerbate their socioeconomic marginality. Rather than treating poverty412
as a source of authenticity, many camp dwellers claim that being maskı¯n (poor or413
miserable) leads people—especially young men—down a crooked path, the end point414
of which is clear to all: entire families lacking a fatherly example and stable financial415
support; children and adolescents lacking proper guidance and turning to the streets;416
shaba¯b lying on the sofas of barber shops or idling on footpaths, engaging in immoral417
activities such as cursing, smoking, watching pornography, and drinking alcohol.418
Many of the people with whom I spoke in al-Wihdat perceived the camp’s deteriorating419
infrastructure as part of an international conspiracy to liquidate the Palestinian issue and420
sink refugees into despair and oblivion. As a friend told me while pointing to a group of421
children playing amidst garbage and debris piled up in the middle of a narrow alley:422
I am afraid for the future! If you live in a bad environment, you grow wild; if you are poor, you423
don’t eat; and if you don’t eat, you can’t sleep. So what do you do? You think, and you get angry,424
more and more, until . . . until something bad happens. This [situation of ours] is still not the lowest425
point, but we are close to it. Once people get to the bottom, they will start making trouble, maybe426
kill each other . . . This is what they [Israel and the USA] want! They want us to kill each other!427
Once refugees have sunk into despair and oblivion, social uneasiness and tension among428
them become a threat to the national cause. In this context, refugees yearn not for429
marginality but rather to reproduce their political identity in terms of practical responsi-430
bilities, such as securing income.49 The otherwise negative connotation of being acquies-431
cent and compliant acquires a positive dimension in the camp, indicating ethico-political432
qualities such as that of s
.
umu¯d (resilience or steadfastness).50433
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M A NAG I N G C O E X I S T I N G M A S C U L I N I T I E S : T RO U B L E ,434
I N C O N S I S T E N C Y, A N D A N X I E T Y435
Palestinians’ commitment to nation and family are not at odds with one another. Amongst436
the youth in al-Wihdat “breadwinner masculinity” constitutes an alternative, yet equally437
attractive, script of masculinity to that of the dawa¯wı¯n and the shuyu¯kh. Like the other438
ideals of masculinity in the camp, breadwinner masculinity serves to reinforce patriarchal439
structures and normative relations of gender domination by prioritizing the man’s role440
as provider over the rather passive role of women in the family.441
However, while the image of the “glorious fighter” sits comfortably within the hege-442
monic ideal of masculinity, that of the “nurturer father” does not, straddling as it does the443
border between the masculine and feminine domains. To be bourgeois-in-the-making in a444
context marked by overt discrimination against Palestinian refugees, camp dwellers have445
to display a form of docility that contradicts the very principles upon which the Pales-446
tinian nationalist agent is built: male assertiveness and independence. Significantly, the447
very attributes that make up breadwinner masculinity—nurturing and steadfastness—448
are often ascribed to the feminine sphere in official Palestinian nationalist discourse449
as well as in camp dwellers’ narratives.51 When the ideal of the patient and nurturing450
mother overlaps with the ideal of the stoic and providing father, the boundaries between451
normative ideals of masculinity and femininity get blurred: what traditionally makes a452
woman a woman becomes constitutive of manhood.52453
Interestingly, these seemingly contradictory scripts of masculinity—the independent454
fighter and the docile breadwinner—coexist simultaneously in the lives of my infor-455
mants. To today’s camp dwellers, manliness necessitates an active process of thinking456
about the consequences of one’s actions. Take, for example, the story that Anas, a young457
man in his mid-twenties whom I came to know for his studiousness and piety, shared458
with me from the time he and his friend worked as seasonal workers at a branch of459
Kentucky Fried Chicken in a wealthy area of Amman. One day several of their Tran-460
sjordanian colleagues at work allegedly disrespected them by ordering them around, in461
response to which Anas and his friend beat them up soundly. Anas told me with evi-462
dent self-satisfaction: “shaba¯b from the camp are different from shaba¯b living in Jabal463
¨Amman and Shmisani, and Abdun! We are mukhayyamjiyye [camp refugees], they are464
like girls [bana¯t]!”465
However, on another occasion, Anas chastised his friend for not being able to secure466
a long-term job, claiming he was lazy (kasla¯n) and too short-sighted to understand that467
being reliable and trustworthy is in most cases more profitable than displaying hyper-468
toughness and independent behavior. Because even ordinary jobs are hard to come by in469
Jordan, dedication and docility are essential virtues for successfully securing a decent470
economic position. While Anas was obviously proud of the sheer exhibition of masculine471
potency in the first episode he recounted, he disapproved of the unthinking display of472
roughness and independence:473
He is a dawa¯njı¯. He can’t do the same job for more than a couple of weeks . . . [because] he is474
too lazy . . . [Also,] he always argues with his employers. After two weeks maximum he loses475
his job. [Most days] he wastes his time in the game rooms, watching girls or drinking . . . if he is476
lucky enough to find someone to pay for his booze!477
mes1500004 cup-mes January 31, 2015 15:30
274 Luigi Achilli
The attempt to reconcile diverse ideals of masculinity is a deeply fragile project in which478
men frequently experience failures, setbacks, and frustrations.479
Within this framework, it is important to shed light on the relationship between the480
youth in the camp and the authorities. From the viewpoint of local authorities, and indeed481
in the popular imagination, shaba¯b in al-Wihdat embody opposition to the state. Their482
interactions with shaba¯b often involve disciplining, monitoring, and repression, all of483
which shaba¯b find humiliating and injurious. Harassment at the hands of overzealous484
police officers, camp dwellers told me, is so common that refugees carefully avoid485
passing by the massive al-Wihdat police station (makhfar) without their identification486
papers. If stopped without proper documents, they can be detained in the station until a487
relative or a friend comes to vouch for them.488
Discrimination and stalled upward mobility, especially in the public sector, endanger489
camp dwellers’ transition to social adulthood, which is dependent upon the capacity to490
provide for the family and live independently. They also exacerbate the marginalization491
of camp dwellers’ masculinity, relegating it to a condition of liminality or negation.492
Negative stereotypes that accompany camp dwellers in their relationships with the493
broader Jordanian society further aggravate this crisis of masculinity. My interlocutors494
frequently complained to me about their incapacity to forge a productive masculinity495
by getting married, having children, and being responsible for wife and kids. Getting496
married is a costly affair and the ability to afford it is undermined by discrimination in497
the public sector. This situation has exacerbated the feeling amongst camp dwellers that498
they are second-class citizens. As Abu Shadi, a young man who works as a taxi driver499
in Amman, put it:500
We are not strangers [aja¯nib] in Jordan, but we are also not like Transjordanians [urduniyyı¯n]; we501
are second-class citizens [muwa¯t
.
inı¯n min al-daraje al-tha¯niye], even fourth class! If a Palestinian, a502
nawarı¯ [equivalent to “gypsy”], and an Egyptian go to themakhfar [police station], the Palestinian503
will be the first to be arrested! . . . I have a friend [a Jordanian of Palestinian origin] who works504
as taxi driver. He was going to Aqaba with a friend of his, a Jordanian, who was driving another505
car. The police stopped the two cars. One [officer] asked for their passports and said to the other506
[police officer] “this one is fine, he is t
.
afı¯lı¯ [inhabitant of al-Tafila].”53 They let him go and gave507
my friend a ticket for speeding . . . You see, Amza [pointing at his brother, who is two years his508
junior]? He passed the tawjı¯hı¯ [secondary examination] with a 70. That’s very good, but he didn’t509
find a job. Transjordanians who get 50 in the tawjı¯hı¯ find a job! And they can work in the army or510
in the police. Let me tell you, we are beneath the Jordanians!511
If discrimination and negative stereotypes tarnish camp dwellers’ chances of living a life512
like that of other Jordanian citizens, they also restrain any enthusiasm for male potency,513
political independence, and toughness. This point is evident in Jordanian filmmaker514
Sandra Madi’s documentaryQamar 14, which takes place in al-Baq¨a, a large Palestinian515
refugee camp on the outskirts of Amman. The film depicts the real life of Faraj Darwish, a516
young boxing champion whose promising career came to an abrupt end upon his refusal517
to fight an Israeli boxer. Born and raised in al-Baq¨a, Farag, similar to many other518
shaba¯b in the camps, was filled with frustration due to unemployment and unfulfilled519
aspirations. He passed his time chatting with friends, idling at home, and playing with520
homing pigeons. Unlike other shaba¯b in the camps, however, there was a time when521
Faraj was well known and popular in the country.522
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In 2004, when he was twenty-one years old, Faraj won the Arab boxing champion title523
in Algeria, a victory that earned him the chance to meet the King of Jordan in person.524
Despite his accomplishment, however, in 2006 the Jordanian Boxing Federation barred525
the newly decorated champion from competing officially again due to his refusal to fight526
an Israeli boxer at an international competition in Turkey. The discriminatory ban irre-527
mediably damaged Faraj’s blooming career, leaving the boxer powerless and embittered,528
capable neither of reaching full socioeconomic integration within the kingdom nor of529
becoming a virile symbol of Palestinian nationalist struggle as a boxing champion from530
Baq¨a.531
C O N C L U S I O N532
Terms like “refugee camp” or “camp dweller community” might induce lingering as-533
sumptions about the homogeneity of models of masculinity. In Jordan, these ideal forms534
of masculinity are abstracted and reified—some romanticized, others “abjected,”54 but535
all pointing to the camp dwellers’ lack of integration despite their status as citizens.536
However, camp dwellers’ masculinities are not uniform. In this article, I have demon-537
strated that it is young men’s ability to move through and master diverse and sometimes538
contrasting registers of manhood that enables them to reproduce a Palestinian national539
identity in exile. In so doing, I have also exposed the utility and limitations of the540
notion of hegemonic masculinity in relation to camp dwellers’ discourses about and541
performances of manliness.542
Over the course of their adolescence and early adulthood, young men in the camp543
reproduce “Palestinian nationalism” as a system of human values and as an everyday544
reality through the negotiation of diverse ideals of masculinity, most notably the figure545
of the dawa¯njı¯ and the shaykh. My research shows that Black September and its imme-546
diate aftermath caused a shift in masculine ideals in the camp. Whereas before Black547
September there were many dawa¯wı¯n in the camp, after this event the dawa¯njı¯, disillu-548
sioned by the broken promises of Palestinian nationalism and deprived of their political549
agency by poverty and governmental control, was gradually replaced by the shaykh as550
the dominant model of masculinity in the camp. Despite their obvious differences, how-551
ever, dawa¯njı¯ and shaykh masculinities share common attributes traditionally ascribed552
to what authors have called hegemonic forms of masculinity. The performance of these553
two paradigmatic models of masculinity in the camp is thus exemplary of the working554
of hegemonic masculine norms at the level of the political subject. In the narratives555
of my informants, the Palestinian national subject is clearly represented in masculine556
terms and re-enacted through the display of male assertiveness, physical strength, and557
independence.558
However, I have demonstrated that the flexibility of camp dwellers’ masculinity is,559
more than anything else, a means to ensure the reproduction of a Palestinian national560
identity in the context of their exile in Jordan. While hegemonic gender norms remain561
crucial, in certain contexts they do not play their normative role. In other words, hege-562
monic masculinity is not the only way of being a man in the camp.55 Not only are563
certain attributes generally associated with subordinate masculinities and/or feminin-564
ity (such as docility and passivity) sometimes preferred over more manly virtues, they565
might even constitute an important source of nationalist agency. Refugees’ display of566
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these attributes reflects their reconciling of the fact of exile in Jordan with their strong567
desire to uphold the values and ideals of Palestinian nationalism. Moreover, it opens a568
space in Palestinian national discourse for seemingly subordinate and feminine ways of569
being male, a space that is generally overshadowed by sometimes-cumbersome ideals570
of masculinity.571
Nevertheless, the simultaneous performance of antithetical forms of masculinity does572
not always bear success. Discrimination at times jeopardizes refugees’ attempts to573
carry out “ordinary” male lives, leaving them powerless and frustrated. The incapacity574
to perform a more contingent masculinity—that is, to harmonize different styles of575
masculinity—ultimately jeopardizes their chances of entering social adulthood as both576
Palestinian and Jordanian males. The failure to move through conflicting registers of577
masculinity reinforces refugees’ experiences of marginality and ultimately broadens the578
chasm between the “refugee” and the “citizen,” relegating camp dwellers to a condition579
of liminality.580
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